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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Confusing Game Plan: The Court
Has to Use Every Play in the Book to Keep Prayer out of
High School Football. Santa Fe Independent School District
v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
INTRODUCTION

Since the founding of this country, debate has raged in society,
in political arenas, and in the courts over the proper relationship between
the government and religion. The United States Supreme Court is often
involved in this conflict and has attempted, on numerous occasions, to
define the proper relationship between church and state. The definition,
however, remains unclear. In Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Jane Doe, the Court made its latest attempt to articulate a test for determining whether a government action is proper, and in the process held
that the School District's policy permitting student-initiated, student-led
prayer before football games violated the Establishment Clause.'
The Santa Fe Independent School District (School District) is a
political subdivision of the State of Texas and is responsible for the education of more than four thousand students. Respondents (Does) are two
sets of current or former students and their mothers; one family is Catholic and the other is Mormon. 3 To protect the respondents from harassment and intimidation by School District officials the Does were allowed
to litigate anonymously. 4 The Does commenced their action in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas in April
1995, alleging that the School District engaged in several proselytizing
practices.5 The challenged practices included promoting attendance at a
Baptist revival meeting, distributing Gideon bibles on school property,
chastising children who held minority religious beliefs, allowing students to give overtly Christian invocations and benedictions from the
stage during graduation ceremonies, and allowing students to deliver

1. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, Individually and as Next Friend for Her
Minor Children, Jane and John Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
Id. at 2271.
2.
3.

Id.

Id.
Id. "Proselytize" is defined as to convert from one religion to another.
WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1821 (3d ed. 1993).
4.
5.
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overtly Christian prayers over the public address system at home football
games.6
On May 10, 1995, the district court entered an order providing
that non-denominational and non-proselytizing prayer consisting of "an
invocation and/or benediction" could be presented by a senior student or
students selected by the members of the graduating class. 7 The invocation could be delivered provided that the class determined the text of the
invocation, and the School District did not scrutinize or pre-approve the
content of the message:' In response to the order, the School District
adopted a series of policies over the next several months concerning
prayer at school functions. 9
The school developed two pre-game prayer policies, the August
policy and the October policy. The August policy, entitled "Prayer at
Football Games," authorized two student elections, the first to determine
whether a student should deliver an invocation, and the second to select
the student to deliver the invocation.' ° The policy contained two parts:
an initial statement that omitted any requirement that the content of the
invocation be "non-sectarian and non-proselytizing" and a fallback provision that automatically added this limiting language in case the preferred policy be challenged in court and enjoined." On August 31, 1995,
the student body elected to allow student prayer at varsity football
games, and a week later in a separate election the student body chose a
student to deliver the prayer. 2 In October, the School District enacted
the final version of the policy.' 3 The only difference between the Octo6.
7.

8.
9.

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. at 2271.
Id. at 2271-72.
Id. at 2272.
Id.

10.

Id.

11.

Id. "Sectarian" is defined as being an adherent of a particular religious sect.

WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2052 (3d ed. 1993).
12.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2000).

13.

Id. The October Policy provides:
Pre-Game Ceremonies at Football Games:
The board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation and/or message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football games to
solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish
the appropriate environment for the competition.
Upon advice and direction of the high school principal, each spring, the high school
student council shall conduct an election, by the high school student body, by secret

ballot, to determine whether such a message or invocation will be part of the pre-game
ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student, from a list of student volunteers, to deliver
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ber policy and the August policy was that the October policy eliminated
the word4 prayer from the title and referred to messages as well as invocations.'
The district court concluded that the open-ended portion of the
policy, which allowed sectarian or proselytizing prayer, was impermissible, because it coerced non-adherent participation in a religious practice.!' Therefore, the district court entered an order precluding the enforcement of the open-ended portion of the policy. 16 The district court
then held that the policy contained a fall-back provision consistent with
an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, Jones v. Clear Creek Independent
School District, which allowed student-led, student-initiated prayer at
high school graduation ceremonies, provided that the prayers were nonsectarian and non-proselytizing.' 7 Since this provision would take effect
automatically if the district court found the open-ended provision unconstitutional, the district court simply ordered the School District to im-

the statement or invocation. The student volunteer who is selected by his or her classmates may decide what statement or invocation to deliver, consistent with the goals and
purposes of this policy.
If the District is enjoined by a court order from the enforcement of this policy, then
and only then will the following policy become the 'applicable policy of the school
board.
The board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation and/or message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home varsity football games to
solemnize the event, to promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish
the appropriate environment for the competition.
Upon advice and direction of the high school principal, each spring, the high school
student council shall conduct an election, by the high school student body, by secret
ballot, to determine whether such a message or invocation will be part of the pre-game
ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student, from a list of student volunteers, to deliver
the statement or invocation. The student volunteer who is selected by his or her classmates may decide what statement or invocation to deliver, consistent with the goals and
purposes of this policy. Any message an/or invocation delivered by a student must be
non-sectarian and non-proselytizing.
Id.
Id. at 2273 (2000).
14.
Jane Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 813 (5th Cir. 1999).
15.
16.
Id.
Id. (citing Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, 971-972 (5th
17.
Cir. 1992)).
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plement the second provision of the policy.' 8 The district court then denied the Doe's request for injunctive relief of any kind.' 9
The School District and the Does appealed, with the School District claiming that the enjoined portion of the October policy was permissible and the Does claiming that both portions of the policy were
unconstitutional. 20 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled in favor of the Does and reversed the district court decision.2 1
The court of appeals stated that the Jones decision applied only to
graduations and not to school-related sporting events. 22 The court of appeals explained, "our decision in Clear Creek II hinged on the singularly
serious nature of a graduation ceremony. Outside that nurturing context,
a Clear Creek Prayer Policy cannot survive. We therefore reverse the
district court's holding that the District's alternative Clear Creek Prayer
Policy can be extended to football games....,,23
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,to decide
whether the School District policy permitting student-initiated, studentled prayer at football games violated the Establishment Clause of the
United States Constitution. 24 The Court held that the policy was unconstitutional.25
This case note discusses the development of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and the various tests used by the Court to decide
Establishment Clause cases. The note goes on to discuss why the Court's
decision in Santa Fe was correct, yet could have done more to clarify
this confusing area of law. The note shows that Justice Stevens had to
apply all three current Establishment Clause tests in order to get a majority of the justices to join his opinion for the Court. While getting the
desired result of one opinion speaking for the Court is more preferable
Id. There was never another election to determine if a prayer would be given or
18.
an election held to determine a student speaker after the enactment of the October policy, which contained the non-sectarian, non-proselytizing language. Id. at 2273. The
only election was under the enjoined August policy, which did not contain the limiting
non-sectarian non-proselytizing language. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120
S. Ct. 2266, 2273 n.5 (2000).
Id.
19.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2000).
20.
Id.
21.
Id.
22.

Jane Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 823 (1999).
24. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S.Ct. at 2275. The Supreme Court did not
address the issue of whether the messages delivered by students at the graduation ceremonies violated the Establishment Clause.
23.

25.

Id.
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than several concurring opinions applying different tests, this note shows
that using all three tests does little to guide school district policy making. As a result, school districts will continue to implement programs
that circumvent or defy the ruling, absent a test that provides clear

guidelines for school districts to follow.
BACKGROUND

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ....,26 Since the mid-twentieth century, the United States Supreme
Court has struggled to decide when a government action constitutes an
establishment of religion. 27 Its struggle has been even greater when the
government entity is a primary or secondary school. 8 In deciding these
cases, the Court has used several different tests to answer the difficult
question of whether or not a school district policy that allows prayer is
unconstitutional. 29
26.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. Although the Free Exercise Clause and the
Free Speech Clause are both important aspects of Santa Fe Independent School Dist v.
Jane Doe, they are beyond the scope of this case note.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
27.
236 (1968); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602 (1971); Comm. for Pub. Instruction and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756
(1973); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Mueller v. Allen, 436 U.S. 388 (1983);
Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 105 U.S. 3232
(1985); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994); Agostini v. Felton, 114 U.S 2481 (1997). The above cases deal with the Establishment Clause as it
pertains to religious schools. See also McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948);
Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1968); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985);
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); West Side Community Sch. v. Mergens,
496 U.S. 226 (1990); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Zobrest v. Catalina, 113
U.S. 2462 (1993). The above cases deal with the Establishment Clause as it applies to
public schools.
28.
See supra note 27.
29.
See Abington Township v. Shempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (holding that if
the policy has no secular purpose and the effect of the policy is to advance or inhibit
religion, there is an Establishment Clause violation). See also Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (holding that if there is excessive entanglement between the
government entity and religion there is a constitutional violation). See also Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that a policy must have a secular legislative
purpose, must not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and the
government must not be excessively entangled with religion to pass constitutional muster). See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concur-
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SeparatingChurch and State. Precursorsto the Current Tests
Two documents the justices frequently rely upon when deciding
Establishment Clause questions are James Madison's letter to the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. 30 A major theme running
through both documents is the fear of government coercion. 3 1 The fear
that the government will establish a religion and that those who do not
adhere to the system will be punished or ostracized guided the Court's
early Establishment Clause decisions.3 2
In 1962, the Court first'addressed the issue of school prayer in
the landmark case of Engel v. Vitale. 33 The five-member majority held
that using the public school system to encourage recitation of prayer was
wholly inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. The majority rea.soned that the First Amendment guarantees that a person's religion is not
subject to government control and that the government is without power
to implement any form of government religion or prayer.34 Justice Black
used a coercion analysis and concluded that the Establishment Clause
prohibited the daily recitation of a non-denominational prayer,.even absent a showing of direct coercion.3 5 In his view, indirect coercion is plain
when the power and prestige of the government is placed behind reliring) (holding that the proper test is to see if there is an endorsement of religion by the
government). See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that the
proper test is to see if there is coercion on the part of the government to force nonadherents to attend a religious function).
30.

ROBERT S. ALLEY, THE CONSTITUTION & RELIGION:

LEADING SUPREME COURT

CASES ON CHURCH AND STATE 29-35 (1999). Madison writes:
[Blecause if religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at large, still less can
it be subject to that of the Legislative Body. The rulers who are guilty of such an encroachment, [taking away the liberties of the people] exceed the commission from
which they derive their authority, and are Tyrants. The people who submit to it are governed by laws'made neither by themselves, nor.by an authority derived by them, and are
slaves.
Id. at 30. Jefferson writes, "[n]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any
religious worship .. nor shall suffer on account of his religious opinions or beliefs...
." Id. at 35.
ALLEY, supra note 30, at 29-35.
31.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333
32.
U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962).
370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding the policy enacted by the school district that
33.
directed the recitation of a prayer by each class at the beginning of each school day
unconstitutional).
Id. at 430.
34.
Id.
35.
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gious beliefs.3 6 Justice Black, describing the Establishment Clause, continued:
Its first and most immediate purpose-rested on the beliefs that a
union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and degrade religion. Another purpose of the Establishment.
Clause rested on the awareness of the historical fact that governmentally established religion and religious persecution go
hand in hand. 3
The view that the government cannot force a religion on the people became the basis of many decisions to follow.3"
A year later, the Court again confronted an alleged violation of
the Establishment Clause in School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp.39 The Schempp Court; however, used a different test to address
'the issue. 40 The Court concluded that if the policy had no secular legislative purpose and the primary effect of the statute or policy was to advance or inhibit religion, the policy was unconstitutional. 41 The Court
reasoned that to pass constitutional muster, the government must remain
neutral, thereby insuring that there is no fusion of government and religious sects.42 According to the Court, by ensuring that the policy in
question has a secular purpose and neither advances nor inhibits a parpractice, the government achieves the neutralticular religious belief or
43
seeks.
Court
,ity that the

Id. at 431.
36.
Id. at 431-32.
37.
See Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Lemon
38.
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that the State's requirement that selections of the
39.
Holy Bible be read and the required recitation of the Lord's Prayer at the opening of the
school day violated the Establishment Clause).
Id. at 222. Writing for the majority, Justice Clark stated:
40.
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment: If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed in the Constitution ... there must
be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.

Id.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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In 1970, the Court approached the question differently in Walz v.
Tax Commission.44 The Court held that tax exemptions for religious entities and other non-profit beneficial and stabilizing entities in community
life. did not violate the Establishment Clause. 45 The Court, however,
looked not only to the legislative purpose of the tax exemptions, but also
to the extent of the administrative and fiscal involvement. between the
state and a religious body.46 The Court determined that even if the policy
or statute contained a secular legislative purpose, if "excessive entanglement" existed between the .state and the religious institution, the financial support was invalid.47
Current Tests.: Lemon, Endorsement, and Coercion
In 1971 the Court decided Lemon v. Kurtzman, reiterating the
tests applied by the Court in the aforementioned cases. 4 8 Following
.Lemon, the -Court has used three partially overlapping tests to determine
if the relationship between the government and religion violates, the Establishment Clause.4 9
(a) The Lemon Test
In Lemon, the Court combined the tests it used to decide earlier
Establishment Clause cases and created one three-pronged test.50 Using
this strict approach, the Court concluded that government reimbursement
to non-public religious schools for the costs of teacher salaries, textbooks and other instrumental materials, and its payment to teachers in
non-public religious schools, resulted in excessive administrative entan-

44.

397 U.S. 664 (1970).

45.
Id. at 679-80.
46.
Id. at 674.
47.
Id' at 675.
48.
403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971). The court used a three-prong test and held that a
Pennsylvania statute and Rhode Island statute, each providing state aid to church-related
institutions, were unconstitutional. Id.
49.
Lemon, 403 U.S: 602 (1971). The Court combined Establishment Clause tests
into a three-prong test [Lemon Test] to decide whether the challenged policy or act
violates the Establishment Clause. Id. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor advanced the endorsement test and
asked whether the challenged practice or policy impermissibly endorsed a particular
religion. Id. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). The majority used the
coercion test, in which the Court determined whether the challenged practice or policy
impermissibly coerces others to participate unwillingly in a religious exercise. Id.
50.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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glement. 5' The policy violated one prong of the test and, therefore, was
2
constitutionally deficient.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice' Burger explained the
three-prong test, "[f]irst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an ex53
cessive government entanglement with religion., The. secular purpose
prong is intended to make sure that the government remains neutral in its
54
actions and does not favor any particular religion. Under the primary
effects prong, to avoid violating the Establishment Clause, the main effect of a statute or policy must be secular, and if the policy has a reli55
gious effect "it must be indirect, incidental, and remote." When dealing
with the entanglement prong of the Lemon test, the Court reasoned that
there could never be total separation between church and state in an absolute sense, and that some relationships between the government and
5 6
To determine if
religious organizations are inevitable and appropriate
there is excessive entanglement, one must examine the purposes and
character of the governmental institution and the resulting relationship

Id. at 613-14.
51.
Id. The majority found that although the statute may contain a secular purpose
52.
and the statute did not have the primary effect of advancing religion, it was still constitutionally deficient because the relationship which arose under the statute involved an
excessive entanglement of the government and religion. Id.
Id. at 612-13.
53.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75-76 (1985). In applying Lemon, the majority
54.
stated that the secular purpose requirement:
[S]erves an important function. It reminds the government that when it acts it should do
so without endorsing a particular religious belief or practice that all citizens do not
share. In this sense the secular purpose requirement is squarely based in the text of the

Establishment Clause it helps to enforce.

Id. See also ERWIN

CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES

986

(1997). "A law is unconstitutional if it fails any prong of the Lemon test." Id.

Penny J. Meyers, Lemon is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon Test to Deter55.
mine the Constitutionality of Prayerat High School Graduation Ceremonies, 34 VAL.

U'.L. REV. 231, 244-45 (1999) (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyguist, 413 U.S. 756, 783-84 n.39 (1973)).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). Justice Burger stated:
56.
Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state requirements under schoolattendance laws are examples of necessary and permissible contacts ....

Judicial cave-

ats against entanglement must recognize that the line of separation far from being a
wall, is a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on the circumstances of a
particular relationship.
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between the government and the religious authority. 7 The relationship
or practice violates the Establishment Clause if it requires "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance.""8 Although the
Court developed the Lemon test when deciding a religious school funding case, it has also used the Lemon standard to decide the appropriateness of policies that allow religious practices in school settings5 9
(b) The Endorsement Test
Although the Supreme Court and lower
the Lemon test, the test was often criticized. 60
cism, the Court established other tests for
Clause issues. For example, the endorsement
O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly is a refinement

courts frequently applied
In response to this critiresolving Establishment
test advanced by Justice
of the Lemon test.6' Con-

57.
Id. at 615.
58.
Id. at 619.
59.
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (holding that a law requiring the posting of the ten commandments on public school class rooms had no secular purpose and
violated the Establishment Clause); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (invalidating a statute authorizing public school teachers to hold a one minute period of silence
for meditation or voluntary prayer since the statute had no secular purpose); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987). The court held that the law requiring public
schools to teach creation science if it also teaches evolution unconstitutional, because
creation science is a religious theory explaining the origin of human life. Id. Therefore
the primary purpose of the law is to endorse a particular religious doctrine. Id.
60.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated:
[T]he Lemon test has no more grounding in the history of the First Amendment than
does the wall theory upon which it rests. The three-part test represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be
as sound as the doctrine it attempts to service. The three part test has simply not provided adequate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases....

Id.
See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1972); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-400 (1993).
61.
465 U.S. 668 at 687-88 (1978) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
stated that the government can violate the Establishment Clause in two ways, excessive
entanglement with a religious institution and government endorsement or disapproval of
religion. Id. Justice O'Connor also explained that the endorsement test is useful because of the analytic content it gives to the Lemon inquiry into purpose and effect. Id.
at 688-89. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor believes that the real evil is government endorsement or disapproval of religion, and the government cannot communicate a message of endorsement
or disapproval, since this gives those persons who hold the endorsed beliefs a certain
amount of power over those who do not. Id. Any time this happens there is the threat
of erosion of the Establishment Clause, therefore when there is alleged government
endorsement or disapproval of a particular religion, the government action must be
carefully scrutinized. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol1/iss2/14
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curring, Justice O'Connor reasoned that a focus on the government endorsement or disapproval of a religious practice or belief made the
Lemon test a more useful device.6 2 According to Justice O'Connor, if
there was no endorsement or disapproval of a religious belief or practice
intended by the government, then the policy had a legitimate secular
purpose and passed this prong of the Lemon test.63 Justice O'Connor also
used the endorsement analysis to determine if the policy had the primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. If the government practice had
the primary effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion, either intentionally or unintentionally,
the practice violated the Establishment Clause. 64
The four dissenting justices agreed with Justice O'Connor that
the real issue in Lynch was whether the government violated the Estab65
lishment Clause by endorsing a particular religious belief or practice.
Thus, even though the dissenters in Lynch disagreed with the majority's
answer to the Establishment Clause question, a majority of the Court
agreed that if the government endorsed a particular religious belief or
practice the challenged policy was unconstitutional.
(c) The Coercion Test
Like the Lemon test, the endorsement test was often criticized.66
This criticism led the Court to rely on the coercion test when deciding
the most recent school prayer cases.67 Reliance on a coercion analysis is
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
62.
Id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63.
Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64.
Id. at 697 n.3 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent explained, "[a]s
65.
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion rightly observes, this test provides a helpful
analytical tool in considering the central question in this case-whether Pawtucket [the
city] has run afoul of the Establishment Clause by endorsing religion through its display
of the creche." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989)
66.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy, dissenting, reasoned:
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional practices recognizing
the place religion holds in our culture, or it must be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we know to have been permitted in the past, while condemning similar practices with no greater endorsement effect simply by reason of their lack
of historical antecedent. Neither result is acceptable.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). See also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 400-01 (1993). See also Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 2449 (1995). Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality,
rejected the symbolic endorsement approach because the approach "exiles private reliId.
gious speech to a realm of less-protected expression ....
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane
67.
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a return to a principle referred to in the very early Establishment Clause

decisions. 6' The Supreme Court clarified the coercion test in Lee v.
Weisman.69 Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, made it clear that the
coercion test was sensitive to public pressure as well as peer pressure on
students, which could be as coercive as any form of overt compulsion. 70
In Lee, the Court decided not to revisit Lemon, but instead focused on the belief that the State should accommodate the religious beDoe, 120 U.S. 2266 (2000).
68.
Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 311 (1952). The Court found no coercion on
the part of the school to get public school students into religious classrooms. However,
the Court reasoned that if coercion were used, if one or more teachers used their office
to persuade or force students to take religious instruction, it would be a different matter.
Id. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). Justice
Black stated:
The Establishment Clause means at least this ... Neither state nor Federal Government
•.. can force nor influence a person to go or remain away from church against his will
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished
for entertaining or professing beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance.
Id. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 71, Champaign County, Illinois, 333
U.S. 203, 209-10 (1947). Justice Black stated, "[p]upils compelled by law to go to
school for secular education are released in part from their legal duty upon the condition
that they attend the religious classes. . . . This . . . falls squarely under the ban of the
First Amendment.
... Id. Engel ev. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962). Justice Black
wrote, "[t]he Establishment Clause . . . does not depend upon any showing of direct
government compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an
official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobservers or not." Id.
69.
505 U.S. 577, 586 (1992). The Court found that including school district's practice of including invocations and benedictions at a public school graduation violated the
establishment clause, because there was coercion of non-adherent participation. Id. The
majority held that the government cannot coerce, directly or indirectly, a student to
attend and participate in a religious practice. Id. If there is overt or indirect coercion,
the policy will not pass constitutional muster. Id. at 599. The Court stated, "[n]o holding by this Court suggest that a school can persuade or compel a student to participate in
a religious exercise. That is being done here, and it forbidden by the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment." Id.
70.
Id. at 593-94. Justice Kennedy stated:
Research in psychology supports the common assumption that adolescents are often
susceptible to pressure from their peers towards conformity, and that the influence is
strongest in matters of social convention. Britain, Adolescent Choices and Parent-Peer
Cross Pressures, 28 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 385 (June, 1963); Clasen & Brown, The
Multidimensionality of Peer Pressure in Adolescence, 14 J. OF YOUTH AND
ADOLESCENCE 451 (Dec. 1985); Brown, Clasen, & Eicher, Perceptions of Peer Pressure, Peer Conformity Dispositions, and Self-Reported Behavior Among Adolescents, 22
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 521 (July 1986).
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liefs and practices of its citizens, yet never coerce non-adherent participation in a religious practice. 7' Instead of applying the past tests, Justice
Kennedy stated:
The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations
imposed by the Establishment Clause. At a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act
in a way which 'establishes a state religion or religious faith, or

tends to do

so.'

72

At the present time, the Court applies the Lemon test, the endorsement
test, and the coercion test separately or together when it decides Estab73
lishment Clause cases, and none of these tests have been invalidated.
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Jane Doe, the Court
decided that student-led, student-initiated prayer prior to football games
74
did in fact violate the Establishment Clause. The majority relied on
four principles to reach its holding. It first discussed and concluded that
since the student speech at issue is not private speech, using the coercion
test from Lee is proper. 75 Second, the majority explained that the government endorsed the message, even though a student would ultimately
76
decide the content of the message. Third, the Court, relying primarily
on Lee, stated that although an election process was in place and attendance at the football games was voluntary, there was impermissible co77
ercion on the part of the School District. Finally, the majority, using
the Lemon test, invalidated the policy on its face for lack of a secular
purpose.

78

The Majority
First, the Court stated that the limitations of the Establishment
Id. at 587.
71.
Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 662, 678 (1984)).
72.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000). Although
73.
the majority relied primarily on the coercion test developed in Lee, the Court also used
the Lemon test and the endorsement test to find the policy constitutionally deficient. Id.
120 S. Ct. 2266, 2275 (2000) (6-3 decision).
74.
Id. at 2275.
75.
Id. at 2277.
76.
Id. at 2279-80.
77.
Id. at 2282.
78.
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Clause and the principles of Lee applied in this case, because the messages authorized by the October policy were not private student speech,
and therefore not outside the bounds of the Establishment Clause. 79 Justice Stevens stated that "[w]e are not persuaded that the pregame invocations should be regarded as private 'speech.' These invocations are authorized by a government policy and take place on government property
at, government sponsored school-related events." ' 0 The Court also relied
on the fact that the forum was not open to anyone who wanted to deliver
a message, noting that the school policy allowed only one student to deliver the pre-game invocations for the entire year.8 ' The majority stated
that the election mechanism used by the school actually limited the types
of messages that could be communicated by the students.8 2 Justice Stevens explained, "Santa Fe's student election system ensures that only
those messages deemed appropriate under the District's policy may be
delivered. That is, the majoritarian process implemented by the District
guarantees, by definition, that minority candidates will never prevail and
that their views will be effectively silenced."8 "
Second, the Court found that the School District policy endorsed
religion, even though "[t]he District has attempted to disentangle itself
from the religious messages by developing the two-step election process."8 4 To make this determination, the majority looked to the language
of the policy, which provided that the election takes place only because
85
an invocation or message.
the School District permits students to give
According to the Court, the government endorsed religion, because:
[T]he policy, by its terms, invites and encourages religious messages. The policy itself states that the purpose of the message is
'to solemnize the event.' A religious message is the most obvious method of solemnizing an event. The only type of message
that is expressly endorsed in the text is an 'invocation. 86
79.
8O.

Id. at 2275.
Id.

Id. at 2276. The majority reasoned, "[t]he Santa Fe school officials simply do
81.
not 'evince either by policy or by practice, any intent to open the pregame ceremony to
indiscriminate use,' . . . by the student body generally." (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 (1988).
Id. at 2276.
82.

83. Id.
84. Id. at 2277.
85. Id. at 2273; see also supra note 13.
86. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 2277-78 (2000). Justice
Stevens went further and explained that an invocation is:
[A] term that primarily describes an appeal for divine assistance. In fact, as used in the
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The majority also looked to the circumstances and context in
which the speeches would be given to show how the School District endorsed religion.8 7 According to the Court, since the student would give
the speech at a school-sponsored program where the school remained in
control of every aspect of the program, there would be an appearance of
school sponsorship of the prayer.8" Justice Stevens explained,
"[r]egardless of the listener's support for, or objection to, the message,
an objective Santa Fe High School student would unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school's seal of
approval." 8 9 The majority also stressed that:
[H]istory indicates that the District intended to preserve the practice of prayer before football games. The conclusion that the District viewed the October policy simply as a continuation of the
previous policies is dramatically illustrated by the fact that the
school did not conduct a new election, pursuant to the new policy, to replace the results of the previous election, which occurred under the former policy. 90
According to the Court, it is reasonable to infer from the school's history
of sponsoring pre-game prayer that the purpose of the policy was to endorse a religion.9 '
Third, the Court found that the policy impermissibly coerced
participation in a religious exercise, since attendance at a football game
is not as voluntary as the School District would have the Court believe.9 2
The majority again stated that the election process failed to insulate the
School District from responsibility, since it "[r]eflects a device put in
place that determines whether religious messages will be delivered at
home games. 93 The Court added:
past at Santa Fe High School, an "invocation" has always entailed a focused religious
message. Thus, the expressed purposes of the policy encourage the selection of a religious message, and that is precisely how the students understand the policy.

Id.
Id. at 2278.
87.
88.
Id.
Id.
89.
Id. at 2279. The court pointed out that the evolution of the current policy from
90.
the long sanctioned office of Student Chaplain to the Prayer at Football Games regulation, combined with the fact no new election was held after the implementation of the
final policy leads to the conclusion that the School District intends to continue the use
of a government endorsed religious practice. Id.
Id. at 2279.
91.
92.
Id. at 2280.
Id.
93.
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The mechanism encourages divisiveness along religious lines in
a public school setting, a result at odds with the Establishment
Clause. Although it is true that the ultimate choice of student
speaker is 'attributable to the students,' the District's decision to
hold the constitutionally problematic election is 'a choice attrib94
utable to the State.'
The Court then stated that attendance at a football game is not voluntary
for cheerleaders, players, and members of the band. 95 The majority also
relied heavily on the fact that, for many students, social pressure to attend these games is just as significant as official pressure applied by the
School District.9 6
Finally, the Court applied the Lemon test and found the policy itself facially deficient, because it had no legitimate secular purpose. 9
Although there had been no prayer delivered under the policy, the Court
stated that the policy's text, standing alone, showed an unconstitutional
purpose. 9' According to Justice Stevens:
The text of the October policy alone reveals that it has an unconstitutional purpose. The plain language of the policy clearly
spells out the extent of school involvement in both the election
of the speaker and the content of the message. Additionally, the
text of the October policy specifies only one, clearly preferred
message-that of Santa Fe's traditionally religious invocation.99
To show the lack of a secular purpose, the Court looked to the history of
the policy and the circumstances surrounding the litigation.1°° The ma94.
95.
96.

Id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992)).
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. at 2280.
Id. The majority stated:
High School football games are traditional gatherings of the school community; they

bring together students and faculty as well as friends and family from years present to
past to root for a common cause ... The choice between whether to attend these games
or to risk facing a personally offensive religious ritual is in no practical sense and easy
one. The Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this difficult
choice upon these students for 'it is a tenant of the first amendment that the State cannot
require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting
conformance to state sponsored religious practice.' (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S.
577, 596 (2000)).

Id.
97.

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 120 S. Ct. at 228 1.

98.

Id. at 2282.

99.

Id.

100.

Id. Justice Stevens stated that an invocation is not even needed to solemnize a
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jority stated that "the simple enactment of this policy, with the purpose
and perception of school endorsement of student prayer, was a constitutional violation. We need not wait for the inevitable to confirm and magnify the constitutional injury.'' The Court again stated that the election
process used by the School District was a constitutional violation, since
process turned a school into a forum for a religious dethe electoral
10 2
bate.
The Dissent
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
found that the majority not only neglected precedent, but distorted the
10 3
true meaning of the Establishment Clause. First, the dissent criticized
the use of the Lemon test to invalidate the policy before a student deliv0
ered a message pursuant to the policy.

4

Second, Chief Justice

Rehnquist reasoned that even under the Lemon test the policy would survive, because the elections deciding what speech to give and who will
05
deliver the messages were not about prayer at all. Finally, the dissent
stated that there was no precedent supporting the majority's seeming
an endorsement of religion, a
demand that, to avoid being considered
06
neutral.
policy must be completely
The dissent reasoned that in Establishment Clause cases the
question that must be answered is not whether the policy might be applied in violation of the Establishment Clause, but whether the policy

football game and the selection of a single student to give messages for the entire year is
not essential to protect free speech. Id. Looking at the context of the policy and the
school removes any doubt that the policy was enacted to endorse school prayer. Id.
Id.
101.
Id. at 2283. The majority reasoned that "this policy likewise does not survive a
102.
facial challenge because it impermissibly imposes upon the student body a majoritarian
election on the issue of prayer. Through its election scheme, the District has established
a governmental electoral mechanism that turns the school into a forum for religious
debate." Id.
Id. at 2283-84 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist stated:
103.
The Court distorts existing precedent to conclude that the school district's studentmessage program is invalid on its face under the Establishment Clause.... Even more
disturbing than its holding is the tone of the Court's opinion; it bristles with hostility to
all things religious in public life. Neither the holding nor the tone of the opinion is
faithful to the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 2284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2285 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
105.
106. Id. at 2287 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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will inevitably be applied in an unconstitutional manner. 0 7 The dissent
stated that the majority used the "most rigid version of the oft criticized
Lemon test" to invalidate the statute; therefore the majority did not properly use the test since the Lemon test is supposed to be a guide, not a
bright-line test.'0 8
The dissent then stated that even under the Lemon standard the
policy was not invalid on its face.' 0 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that the election was not about prayer and religion; it was about who the
speaker would be. The dissent observed that it was possible that no
prayer would ever be given under the policy, and that the students could
have chosen a speaker on wholly secular grounds." 0 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote, "it is possible that the students might not vote to have a
pregame speaker, in which case there would be no threat of a constitutional violation. It is also possible that the election would not focus on
prayer, but on public speaking ability or social popularity.""' Moreover,
the dissent stated that the instant case is distinguishable from Lee, because the issue in Lee was government speech; in this case the students
chose the speaker and the speaker
chose the content of the speech, there12
private.'
was
speech
the
fore
The dissent went on to state that the policy itself had a plausible
secular purpose, solemnizing a sporting event and promoting good
sportsmanship." 13 Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned that, "[w]here a government body 'expresses a plausible secular purpose' for an enactment,
'courts should generally defer to that stated intent."' ' 4 According to the
dissent, "[t]he Court grants no deference to-and appears openly hostile
toward-the policy's stated purposes, and wastes no time in concluding
that they are a sham."'" 5 The dissent also pointed out that the School6
District went further than necessary to keep from endorsing prayer."
Id. at 2284 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
108.
Id. at 2284 n. 1 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned
that while the majority rightly pointed out that in facial challenges in the Establishment
Clause context the Court looked to Lemon as a guide, the majority applied the test so
stringently and struck down the policy on its face in anticipation of an unconstitutional
application of the policy, which earlier case law warned against doing. Id. (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
109.
Id. at 2285 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
110.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Ill.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
112.
Id. at 2287 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
113.
Id. at 2286 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
114.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)).
115.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
116.
Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
107.
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The School District allowed a message or invocation when all the district
court ordered was that it include the limiting "non-sectarian, nonproselytizing language. ' ' 1 7
Finally, the dissent pointed out that the majority seemed to demand that a government policy be content neutral, and that this has never
been a requirement under the Court's endorsement test or any other
test."' The dissent reasoned that only in free speech cases is strict scru9
tiny applied to content-based restrictions."
ANALYSIS

The Court decided correctly that the School District's policy allowing pre-game prayer violated the Establishment Clause. However, the
Court's division on issues concerning the relationship between the government and religion forced Justice Stevens to apply all three tests in
120
order to get the six-member majority. Unfortunately the Court's reluctance to adopt and consistently use one test makes it difficult for school
districts to develop policies in conformance with Supreme Court decisions concerning school prayer.
Overlap of Tests to Get the Desired Result
(a) Accommodation but not Coercion
One approach the Court takes when interpreting the Establishment Clause is the accommodation approach. "Under this view, the
Court should interpret the establishment clause to recognize the importance of religion in society and accommodate its presence in government.'0' Conversely, the government violates the Establishment Clause
2
only if it literally establishes a church or coerces participation. 2 According to adherents of this approach, "[t]he purpose of a religious accommodation is to relieve the believer-where it is possible to do so
without sacrificing significant civil or' 23social interests-from the conflicting claims of religion and society."'

Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2287 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
118.
Id. at 2288 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
119.
See Santa Fe Independent School Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000).
120.
Justice Stevens relied on the coercion test, the endorsement test, and the Lemon test. Id.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, at 981.
121.
117.

122.

Id.

Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 85 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 26
123.
(1985).
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The accommodation approach is the most amicable to religion.
Nonetheless, there is a limit to what actions are allowed. The purpose of
accommodation is to enable a person to practice her faith, not to coerce
or induce a person to adopt a religious practice she would not freely
choose. 124 In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy espoused the view that
while religion should be accommodated, a policy coercing non-adherent
participation would fail. 2 5 Prayer exercises are coercive, and therefore
improper, when the state compels attendance and participation in a religious exercise at an event of importance to students, and objecting students have no choice but to attend. 126 Since the School District compelled some student participation in a religious event, Justice Kennedy
agreed with Justice Stevens that the School District coerced student parevent, and therefore the policy could not pass
ticipation in a religious
27
muster.
constitutional
The School District argued that coercion was lacking because attendance at a high school football game is voluntary. 12 In arguing that
students can easily choose not to attend a game if they find the pre-game
prayer objectionable, the School District asked the Court to ignore the
importance and influence of Texas high school football to students, parents, and the community. 129 Justice Kennedy reasoned in Lee that social
pressure to attend a school-sponsored event, during which a religious

124.

Id. at 35.

505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). See also Ira C. Lupu, The LingeringDeath ofSepara125.
tism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230, 255 n. 197 (1994) and accompanying text.
126.
Id. at 598. See also infra note 129.
Brief for Respondent at 32, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct.
127.
2266 (2000) (No. 99-62) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. A significant number of
students are compelled to attend by the School District's policy. Id. The parties stipulated that cheerleaders and band members are required to attend the pre-game ceremonies, including the prayer. Id. Band is a course that some students receive academic
credit for attending. Id.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2279 (2000).
128.
Three Cheers for High School Football, TEXAS MONTHLY MAGAZINE, 111
129.
(1999), available at www.texasmonthly.com/mag/1999/oct/footballintro.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2000).
It's a game, an extracurricular activity, a community bond, the state religion, the biggest
show in town every Friday night in the fall, a character builder, a revered symbol, an inTexas high school football respirational rallying point that offers a rare moment ....
mains one of the few institutions that distinguishes us from the rest of the universe. We
have more coaches, band members, cheerleaders, and pep squads than anyone else. Our
fans are more fanatical. Our boosters are more loyal. Our parents are more passionate.
Id. See also H.G. BISSINGER, FRIDAY NIGHT LIGHTS: A TOWN, A TEAM, AND A DREAM
(1990) ( explaining the importance of high school football in many Texas communities).
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message is given, is just as impermissible as direct pressure from a
government entity. 130
Like the students in Lee, non-adherent Santa Fe students who do
not agree are pressured, not only by the school, but the public and their
peers, to comply with the policy and take part in the pre-game ceremonies. 31 According to Lee, this type of indirect coercion is as impermissi1 32
ble as direct government coercion. The social pressure in the present
case is even more coercive than the social pressure in Lee, because the
School District allowed the majority to force its views on the minority
33
through the use of a school sponsored election.' The election permitted
the majority to convey its religious views while leaving those with mitheir views.1 34
nority religious opinions without a forum to espouse
While a person's religious belief should be accommodated, instituting a
mechanism that accommodates only one religious practice135 while forcing
and improper.
those who disagree to conform is coercive
Pressure to attend the ceremonies and participate in the religious
exercises was especially strong in this case, because non-adherence to
the religious exercises lead to harassment from peers and school officials.' 36 Due to these coercive pressures exacted on the students, it is
clear that Justice Kennedy agreed with Justice Stevens that the policy
was coercive in nature, and therefore unconstitutional.

Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. See also supra note 70, and accompanying text.
130.
See infra note 136.
131.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
132.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2273 (2000). See supra
133.
13.
note
Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys. v. Southworth, 120 U.S. 1346, 1357
134.
(2000). The Court in explaining the problematic nature of elections that determine
which activities receive school support noted:
To the extent the referendum substitutes majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the program requires. The whole
theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated with the same respect as
are majority views. Access to a public forum ... does not depend on majoritarian consent. That principle is controlling here.

Id.
Lee, 505 U.S. at 592-93.
135.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 127, at 2. "There was uncontradicted evidence
136.
of verbal harassment of students who declined to accept Bibles or objected to prayers
and religious observances in school." Id. "One witness-not a plaintiff-began homeschooling her youngest daughter to avoid persistent verbal harassment, with pushing and
shoving, over issues of religion in the public school." Id.
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(b) Policy Lacks Neutrality and Endorses Religion
The second Establishment Clause approach seeks neutrality towards religion; "that is, the government cannot favor religion over secu' Justice O'Connor is the key prolarism or one religion over others.
ponent of the no-endorsement approach, which is meant to keep the government from favoring any particular religion or religious practice. 3 '
Under this approach, the School District's policy could not survive. Prior
to 1995, an elected student, the student council chaplain, delivered prayers over the public address system before each home varsity football
game. It was only after this practice was challenged in court that the
School District made any attempt to develop a less-religiously oriented
policy. 3 9 Thus, it appears that at the very least, the School District poli-

cies favored religion over secularism, and by definition violate Justice
O'Connor's endorsement approach, which seeks to prevent this type of
favoritism. 140
Until there is clear evidence of a new purpose, the historic purpose of endorsing prayer is presumed to continue.14' The School District
claimed that its purpose was to promote free speech and that invalidating
the policy would force the school to censor student speech. 142 The policy
language does not support the School District's claimed purpose, because the policy only allows one student to speak for the entire season.
In addition, the only expressly authorized message is an invocation. 143
Not only is an invocation generally regarded as a religious type of message, the School District's history indicates that invocation means religious message. 144 The School District's history of encouraging prayer,
137.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, at 978.
138.
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
139.
Santa Fe Indep. Seh. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S. Ct. 2266, 2272 (2000).
140.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
141.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs. (TOC), Inc., 120 S.
Ct. 693, 708-709 (2000). This common-sense proposition is implicit in the Court's cases
holding that where a defendant has abandoned unlawful conduct in the face of litigation,
that defendant bears a "heavy burden" of showing that defendant will not resume the
illegal conduct. Id. at 708. The presumption that a defendant might resume the illegal
conduct necessarily entails a presumption of continuing purpose to do so, and that a
continuing purpose to do so may of course be manifested in slightly altered and allegedly lawful conduct. Id. at 709.
142.
Brief for Appellant at 44-45, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S.Ct.
2266 (2000) (No. 99-62) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. "Santa Fe 'has chosen to
permit' student-initiated, student-delivered speech during pre-game ceremonies of home
varsity football games .... To strike that policy down would be to interpret the Establishment Clause as imposing an affirmative obligation on the states to censor religious
speech where other speech is allowed." Id.
143.
See supra note 13.
144.
WEBSTER'S 3D NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1190 (3d ed. 1993). "Invoca-
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combined with the fact that the School District retained the most religion
friendly policy for as long as possible, is evidence that the true purpose
was to continue sponsorship of religious activities at
of the 4policy
51
school.
According to Justice O'Connor, the endorsement test focuses on
the perception of the reasonable observer. 146 A reasonable observer at a
school sponsored football game, knowing the importance of prayer to the
School District, would view the prayer given as sponsored by the School
District. According to one amicus curia brief:
After sitting in the high school football stadium, hearing the announcer call the crowd to order and introduce the student offering the prayer, watching the crowd stand together in an attitude
of reverence, and listening to the prayer over the school's loud
speaker system, any reasonable observer would inescapably conSchool District endorses the
clude that the Santa Fe Independent
47
prayer.
of
religious act
Justice O'Connor could not validate the prayer under her noendorsement analysis because a reasonable observer would perceive the
prayer as delivered with the permission of, and on behalf of, the school

tion" is defined as "a prayer of entreaty that is usually a call for the divine presence and
is offered at the beginning of a meeting or service of worship." Id. See also Santa Fe
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 2272 n.4 (2000).
The student giving the invocation thanked the Lord for keeping the class safe through
12 years of school and for gracing their lives with two special people and closed: 'Lord,
we ask that You keep Your hand upon us during this ceremony and to help us keep You
in our hearts through the rest of our lives. In God's name we pray. Amen.' (citing App.
54).
Id.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 127, at 36. "The Court of Appeals concluded
145.
that the claimed secular purpose is a sham." Id. See also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist.,
120 S.Ct. at 2279. The Court stated, "in light of the school's history of regular delivery
of-a student-led prayer at athletic events, it is reasonable to infer that the specific purpose was to preserve a popular 'state-sponsored religious practice.' " (quoting Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)). Id.
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773 (1995)
146.
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that the endorsement test' focuses
upon the perception of a reasonable, informed observer; moreover this observer "must
be deemed aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the
religious display appears." Id. at 780.
Brief Amicus Curai for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, et al. at
147.
7, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jane Doe, 120 S.Ct. 2266 (2000) (No. 99-62).
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officials. 14 ' Therefore, she joined Justice Steven's opinion, which relied

heavily on the endorsement test.
(c) Separationists hold onto the Lemon Test
The strict separation approach is the final major approach used
by the Supreme Court when determining Establishment Clause questions. Justices who favor the strict separation approach, including Justice
Stevens, also favor using the Lemon test. 149 Justice Stevens easily found

the policy violated the first prong of the test, which requires that a policy
allowing prayer have a legitimate secular purpose. 50 Because the policy,

on its face, specifically allowed only an invocation, and since invocation
meant prayer to everyone involved, the policy had no secular purpose

and was unconstitutional.'
Although a separationist, Justice Stevens could not rely solely on
the Lemon test and to get one majority opinion speaking for the Court.' 52
Justice Stevens was careful to rely heavily on both the endorsement test
and the coercion test to get the important swing votes of Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy.'53 Although the case law on school prayer does
148.
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773 (1995)
(O'Connor, J. concurring).
149.
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 54, at 986; see also Lupu, supra note 125, at 255
n.197 (1994) and accompanying text (reasoning that Justice Stevens is still rather
"staunchly separationist").
150.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
151.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 66 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). If the
law was enacted for the purpose of endorsing religion, the secular purpose prong is not
met, and "no consideration of the second or third criteria is necessary." Id.
152.
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1990). Kennedy chose not to use the
Lemon analysis and instead chose to use a coercion analysis to evaluate school prayer
cases. See also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining why the endorsement test provides a more helpful analysis than the strict
Lemon test).
153.
Lee, 505 U.S. 577. This opinion shows Justice Kennedy follows the accommodation approach and favors the coercion test. Had Justice Stevens relied sole on Lemon
Justice Kennedy, if agreeing with the result, likely would have not joined the Stevens's
opinion, but concurred and used the coercion analysis. Moreover, if Justice Stevens
relied solely on the endorsement test, it is also unlikely that Justice Kennedy would
have joined the opinion. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 492 U.S. 668, 668-78 (Justice Kennedy concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy levels criticism at Justice O'Connor's endorsement test and shows
his preference to the coercion analysis. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 604 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor agreed with Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion which stated, "[p]roof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an
Establishment Clause violation. The court has repeatedly recognized that a violation of
the Establishment Clause is not predicated on coercion." Id. Since Justice O'Connor
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not show the specific approaches that Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer favor, it does seem that one thing is clear: each of their views fall
somewhere between strict separation and accommodation, and none of
them are as deferential to policies that allow prayer as Justices Scalia,
Rehnquist, and Thomas. 5 4 As a result, Justice Stevens used a conglomerate of all three tests such that each of the six majority Justices could
find a part of the opinion that conformed to his or her view on school
prayer.
Endorsingthe Endorsement Test
Although the Court decided Santa Fe correctly, the decision does
little to create a coherent standard for school districts to follow. Due to
the fact that all of the tests are presently valid, and because the Court
seems to apply whichever test will get the desired result in a particular
the
setting, many scholars have written to explain, praise, and criticize
55
tests.1
these
of
application
confusing
the
tests themselves and
seems to agree with the proposition that coercion is not needed to show a violation, it is
unlikely that even if she agree with the ultimate result that the policy was unconstitutional she would have agreed with using only the coercion analysis.
Lee, 505 U.S. 577 (Souter, J., concurring). In his concurring opinion, Justice.
154.
Souter expressed the view that government sponsorship of prayer at a graduation ceremony is best understood of endorsement of religion, and coercion is not necessary to a
successful Establishment Clause claim. See also Lupu, supra note 125, at 255 n.197.
The center will be controlled by Souter and Ginsburg, whose views on permissive accommodation remain unknown. Id.
See Jeremy T. Bunnow, Note, Reinventing the Lemon: Agostini v. Felton and
155.
the ChangingNature of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,1998 WIs. L. REV. 1133
(1998); Harriet Grant, Note, Lynch v. Donnelly: The Disappearing Wall, 63 N.C. L.
REV. 782 (1985); Paula Savage Cohen, Psycho-Coercion, A New Establishment Clause
Test: Lee v. Weisman and its Initial Effect, 73 BOSTON UNIVERSITY L. REV. 501 (1993);
Penny J. Meyers, Lemon is Alive and Kicking: Using the Lemon Test to Determine the
Constitutionalityof Prayerat High School Graduation Ceremonies, 34 VAL. U. L. REV.
231 (1999); Kristin J. Graham, Comment, The Supreme Court Comes Full Circle: Coercion as the Touchstone of an Establishment Clause Violation, 42 BUFF. L. REV. 147
(1994); Carole F. Kagan, Squeezing the Juice from a Lemon: Toward a Consistent Test
for the Establishment Clause, 22 N. Ky. L. REV. 621 (1995); Ronald C. Khan, Religion
and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman: God Save Us From the Coercion Test:
ConstitutiveDecision Making, Polity Principles,and Religious Freedom, 43 CASE W. R.
L. REV. 983 (1993); Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Courts Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905 (1987); Harlan A. Loeb,
Suffering in Silence: Camouflaging the Redefinition of the Establishment Clause, 77 0.
L. REV. 1305 (1998); Richard J. Ansson Jr., DrawingLines in the Shifting Sand: Where
Should the Establishment Wall Stand? Recent Developments in Establishment Clause
Theory: Accommodation, State Action, the Public Forum, and Private Religious Speech,
8 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 1 (1998); Daniel 0. Conkle, Symposium, Religion
and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman: Lemon Lives, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
865, (1993); Jessica Smith, Student-InitiatedPrayer: Assessing the Newest Initiatives to
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This confusion spills over into the rest of the court system and
leads to various applications of the tests and differing decisions among
courts throughout the different circuits. 5 6 Since the courts do not apply
the tests consistently, school boards have no clear boundaries for drafting policies dealing with prayer. 5 7 Had the Court in Santa Fe taken the
opportunity to use one test instead of all three to decide this case, school
districts would have more definite guidelines to follow when drafting
policies, and courts would have a consistent test to use if these policies
are challenged.
Although criticized, the endorsement test is the most preferable
approach. The endorsement test is broad enough and flexible enough to
encompass the Court's understandable concerns about subtle and overt
coercive pressures that violate an individual's freedom to believe or not
to believe the religious precepts advanced by a challenged government
action. If a government action endorses or disapproves of a particular
religion, then the policy, by definition, does not have a secular purpose
and therefore violates the Establishment Clause.158 As a result, when a
school district drafts a policy concerning prayer, the school district must
be sure that the policy in no way advances or supports a particular religious belief or practice by words or by actions.
Unfortunately, reality shows that when the Supreme Court delivers a school prayer decision, school districts interpret the decision in a
way that allows them to continue to implement prayer policies, many of
which could be viewed as impermissible. 5 9 Continued backlash from the
Return Prayerto the Public Schools, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 303 (1996).
156.
Applying each of the tests has become common in cases dealing with prayer in
public schools. See Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, (5th Cir.
1992) (applying the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test to hold that
non-sectarian, non-proselytizing prayer at graduation ceremonies constitutional); ACLU
v. Black Horse Pike Reg'l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996) (discussing each
prong of the Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test); Ingebretsen v.
Jackson Public Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing each prong of the
Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test); Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch.
Dist., 994 F.2d 160, 166 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993) (explaining its rejection of the Lemon test,
and using a "case-bound, fact sensitive approach based on analogy to Supreme Court
decisions); Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (1993) (applying
the Lemon test to strike down a statute for lack of secular purpose.); Alder v. Duval
County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994), aff'd 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir.
1997) (applying the Lemon test and the coercion test to determine the policy in question
had a secular purpose and did not coerce non-adherents).
157.
See supra note 156; see also infra notes 160-61.
158.
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 642, 690 (1984).
159.
Brief For Respondent, supra note 127 at 28-29. "After Jones v. Clear Creek
Indep. Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963, and following a student vote to authorize the practice,
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Santa Fe decision shows that many people do not agree with the Court's
160
hotly contested.
ruling, and issues concerning school prayer are still
Around the country, school districts are defying or circumventing the
Santa Fe decision by using various methods to continue the practice of
pregame prayer. 16 ' The situation is analogous to the attempts made by
school districts to circumvent earlier school prayer decisions by attempt1 62
A strict standard is
ing to delegate responsibility to the students.
Wingfield High School in Jackson, Mississippi began opening each day with prayer
'over the school intercom system to all students who, during which, were required to
remain at their desks.' " (quoting Ingebretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp.
1473, 1478 (S.D. Miss. 1994), aff'd 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996)). Id. at 28.
The Mississippi legislature responded to the ensuing controversy with its School Prayer
Statute, authorizing non-sectarian student-initiated voluntary prayer at all school-related
events, whether compulsory or not. The School Prayer Statute assumed that if studentinitiation works to privatize prayer at one official school event, it should work at any
other school event.
Id. at 29.
Alicia Gooden, Residents: Courtfumbled prayer decision, GALVESTON COUNTY:
160.
THE DAILY NEWS, (June, 2000), available at www.galvnews.comfNF/omf/freedail... 08.
(last visited Nov. 12, 2000). Following the Supreme Court decision, citizens on both
sides of the debate voiced their opinion: Stephanie Vega, a student at Santa Fe: "was
counting on the nation's high court to look out for the interests of the entire student
body. 'I totally agree with the opinion' said the sixteen-year-old senior. 'You cannot
impose your prayers on everybody.' " Id. Vega said the decision did not preclude students from praying by themselves. What it prohibited was praying before a captive
audience using a taxpayer-funded public address system. " 'You can't shove prayer
down people's throats,' she said." Id. Mary Key, did not agree, " 'I am very disappointed,' she said. 'Prayer should be allowed anywhere at any time.' To Key, the assertions of religious discrimination from the Mormon and Catholic families who originally filed the suit were unfounded. 'No one was shoving prayer down their throats....
They had the option to go or not to go to the football games. They did not have to listen
to it.' " Id.
Timothy Roche, Too Much Like A Prayer?Flouting a Supreme Court ban on
161.
the practice,football fans appeal to the Lord on game day., TIME, (Sept. 11, 2000),
9
available at www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2000/0 /18/prayer.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2000).
As Friday-night lights begin to bum on another high school football season, a not-soquiet revolution is emerging in Southern states .... In nearly two dozen season openers
earlier this month, students and religious groups came up with ingenious ways to protest-and in some instances, defy-the court's decision.
Id. An example of this was seen in Yellville-Summit High School in Arkansas where
fans "emptied from the bleachers two weekends ago and rushed to the fifty-yard line,
kneeling and praying with the cheerleaders, who had traded their pom-poms for banners
bearing biblical passages. The local school board, which had voted to test the limits of
the court decision, helped organize the students." Id.
See Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment
162.
Clause, 75 IND. L.J., Winter (2000); Colin Delaney, The Graduation Prayer Cases:
Coercion By Any Other Name, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1783, (1999); Jessica Smith, "Student-
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needed to keep future school boards from attempting to insulate themselves from review by delegating the decision about prayer to students
through mechanisms such as elections. By authorizing an election regarding whether prayer will be part of a school-sponsored activity, a
school board lets the majority decide what a person's fundamental rights
are. This is impermissible since, as the Court has previously noted, "fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."' 163 A policy that uses the machinery of the state to
advance religion could not possibly satisfy the endorsement test, since
school sanctioned voting over religious issues allows impermissible involvement with the process and impermissible endorsement of the religious message given by the student.' 64 Therefore, the endorsement test is
strict enough to prevent governmental bodies from insulating themselves
from review through the use of various mechanisms such as elections,
while at the same time allowing school districts to create prayer policies
so long as the school district does not itself adopt the religious speech
given as their own.
When analyzing a policy dealing with prayer, not only must a
court determine whether the school district is trying to delegate their
responsibility, it must also closely examine the stated secular purpose of
the policy. When the secular purpose is questionable, a strict standard is
needed to make sure a legitimate secular purpose exists.
Justice O'Connor believes that sometimes policy makers will
produce a sham secular purpose for a policy, but she also believes that
the Court is capable of determining a sham secular purpose from a legitimate one. 65 When it appears that the purpose is a sham, using the
endorsement analysis is arguably the best way to analyze the issue, since
the test redefines the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test. 166 Simply
Initiated" Prayer: Assessing the Newest Initiatives to Return Prayer to the Public
Schools, 18 CAMPBELL L. REV. 303, Summer (1996) (above articles discuss how school
districts try to return prayer to public school settings by using various mechanisms such
as elections to insulate themselves from judicial review).
163.
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628 (1943).
164.
Brief for Respondent, supra note 127, at 24. "[A] government decision made
by the voters is just as much a government decision as one made by their elected representatives." (relying on Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)). Id. See also
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 336-37 (1964). "A citizen's
constitutional rights can hardly be infringed because a majority of the people choose
that it be." Id. See also Nixon v. Shrink, 120 S. Ct. 897, 908 (2000). "[M]ajority votes
do not, as such, defeat First Amendment protections." Id.
165.
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 65, 75 (2000) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166.
Id. at 75-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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put, if there is government endorsement the policy lacks a secular purpose. 67 If someone brings a suit to stop a religious activity, then obviously at least that person finds the practice offensive and a violation of
his fundamental rights. 16 If the policy allowing the offensive practice is
based on a sham secular purpose, then the policy cannot survive, since
school endorsement of a particular religious practice "puts school age
children who object in an untenable position."' 69
Using Justice O'Connor's endorsement approach to review
prayer policies would hopefully discourage school boards from using
delegation mechanisms and purporting sham secular purposes to endorse
prayer. According to James Madison, "[i]t is proper to take alarm at the
first experiment with our liberties."'' 70 The endorsement test is strict
enough to prevent school districts from implementing programs that
promote prayer. As a result applying this standard would go a long way
toward insuring that a policy does not infringe on the rights of students
who do not adhere to the religious beliefs or practices of the majority.
CONCLUSION

In Santa Fe the Court correctly found the School District's policy unconstitutional. Unfortunately, the Court analyzed the issue under
all three Establishment Clause tests. As a result, the decision does not
create a clear standard for lower courts or school districts to follow. As
the law stands now, all three tests are valid and inconsistent decisions
will therefore inevitably continue to make their way to the Supreme
[T]he Lemon inquiry into the effect of an enactment would help decide those close cases
where the validity of the expressed secular purpose is in doubt. While the secular purpose requirement alone may rarely be determinative in striking down a statute, it nevertheless serves and important function. It reminds government that when it acts it should
do so without endorsing a particular religious belief or practice that all citizens do not
share. In this sense the secular purpose requirement is squarely based in the text of the
Establishment Clause it helps to enforce.

Id.
167.

Id.

See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 423 (1962). Ten pupils brought suit alleging
168.
the use of official prayer in public schools was contrary to their religious beliefs. Id.
See also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). The
Schempp family, of Unitarian faith, brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a state statute
requiring ten verses of the Holy Bible be read at the opening of every public school day.
Id. See also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 581-584 (1992). Deborah Weisman, age
fourteen, brought suit through her next of friend, Daniel Weisman, to enjoin a school
district policy allowing members of the clergy to deliver an invocation during graduation ceremonies. Id.
169.
170.

Id. at 590.
ALLEY, supra note 30, at 30.
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Court. Had the Court taken the opportunity to use only the endorsement
analysis, that uniform standard would have, at the very least, created less
confusing Establishment Clause jurisprudence and given school districts
one standard to abide by when drafting policies dealing with prayer in
the school setting.
LANCE
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